Socialists, Syndicalists, and other collectivist groups will often posture their system as one of worker supremacy. They will also characterize Capitalism as a system of employer supremacy. This is not the truth, as if a system had to favor either employers or employees. Capitalism is rather a system of consumer supremacy – for both employee and employer are alike in their office as consumers. Both employer and employee are ultimately subject to the demands of the consumer.

Democracy, on the other hand, is thought of as a system of voter supremacy. Yet it is not the supremacy of the individual voter, but the supremacy of a collective of voters: the tyranny of the majority. The voters are homogenized, and the preferences of the collective are forced upon the individuals of the group with all manner of regulations and prohibitions, restrained (usually) only by provisions of particular sacred rights. It is not only a static system but a coercive one, forcing that stasis upon the electorate through myriad public programs.

And as if this were insufficiently worrying, the reins of the collective are even indirect: though they may vote for or against representatives, once a representative is in, he has more or less free reign until the next election. And given that representatives are a package deal of issues, they may not even sufficiently represent the majority in all their decisions (for example, a politician elected on the basis of one issue who then thwarts the electorate on other issues). The incumbent representative has much leeway for caprice on all but the most inflammatory issues.

Democracy is often characterized as being compatible with (and sometimes even necessary for) Capitalism: one a political system and the other an economic system. This is, however, a false dichotomy – for what is politics now but economics? Both now act as systems of distribution; the difference is that one is also a system of production. Democracy is not necessary for Capitalism; Capitalism is necessary for Democracy.

The history of the past 80 years has been the Democratic system of distribution and redistribution gradually encroaching upon and displacing the Capitalist system of distribution. People are ceding their individual supremacy as consumers to the collective as voters. No longer is mutual agreement sufficient justification for an exchange; now mob rule has crystallized into a monstrous and ever-expanding regulatory and welfare state. The default of freedom has been replaced with obsequiousness to the collective – or at least those institutions which claim to represent it.

I believe in the supremacy of the individual realized through his office as a consumer. This is incompatible with any form of collective supremacy, including Democracy. It is for this reason that we are better off without a legislature – without an avenue for mob rule to encroach directly or indirectly upon the agency of the individual.

Somewhere along the way, American Christianity became affected of the idea of family friendliness. Perhaps the rise of the Family Research Council in the 1980s and James Dobson’s Focus on the Family radio programs were influential in this regard; perhaps they were merely symptomatic. Perhaps Christians were en masse enchanted by the idea; perhaps there was a flood of people brought up in or converted under these pretenses. Either way, as far as consumer culture goes, “Christian” is now a practical synonym for “family friendly”.

But this does not necessarily follow. In fact, it makes almost no sense at all. The Bible, for example, does not at all conform to Christian standards of “family friendly”. Judges is awfully gory. Psalms is full of laments about people who don’t get what’s coming to them in life. Genesis has more than a few accounts of incest, even after Adam & Eve’s kids. A conception of Christianity molded into a family friendly model leaves the individual unprepared not only to deal with the realities of God as revealed in the scriptures, but unprepared to deal with life in general as an ambassador of Christ.

Family Friendly Culture

The ideas represented by Dr. Dobson and his organization represent an astoundingly faithless view of Christianity. Rather than being taught of bad influences, how to deal with them, and why they are bad, children are sheltered from all possible exposure these influences. This sort of attitude presents a dilemma to parents. One the one hand, kids will be kids, and the parent either does not want to or is not able to totally shelter the child. On the other hand, they don’t believe kids can handle the ideas out there. Rock music isn’t itself objectionable; it’s just the lyrics and themes. Reading is good; the kid just doesn’t need to be exposed to opposing worldviews.

And so a market niche is created to solve this problem: duplicate and sanitize. The people who fill this demand in any medium don’t need much wiggle room: the product needs to seem similar enough to mainstream fads to be cool – just with a “positive message”.

Incidentally, this is one of the reasons why The Passion of the Christ was so controversial in Christian circles: it shined a violent and bloody yet sadly brief spotlight on the fact that Christianity is not necessarily synonymous with family friendly.

It’s easy to see then how the Dobson mentality has stilted Christian creativity. This is why we have Christian pop and rock which most often comes off as mediocre clones of mainstream bands. This is why Christian fiction never breaks out of its niche market. This is why Christian film is seen from the outside as laughable. This is why Christian fashion (especially t-shirts) is more often than not painfully kitschy. Mainstream “family friendly” Christian culture offers nothing new, because its niche is “sanitize”, not “innovate”. The former imperative has totally superseded the latter.

Family Friendly Politics

The rise of the Christian Right as a political force can also be directly attributed to this mindset. In fact, this is more likely the direct result of the Dobson mentality and the culture the byproduct, for the Family Research Council is first and foremost a lobbying organization.

When pressed, almost anyone who advocates the Christianization of American culture (read: family friendlization) will eventually appeal to a form of the “think of the children” argument. It is the same sort of faithless idea of parenting applied to the government: if kids are screwed up more or less automatically by exposure to bad influences, why leave those decisions in the hands of the parent? Let the state prohibit gay marriage, lest the culture come to accept that lifestyle as normal and a child not know any better. Let the state regulate the sale and advertisement of alcohol and cigarettes lest a child become spoiled by the desire to indulge.

Obviously these fears are nonsensical to any Christian with a semblance of an understanding of the doctrine of election. But as this mindset prevails, Christianity becomes less about any particular doctrine than the sort of lifestyle one lives. Even as it becomes more blatantly counterproductive to the gospel, it also suppresses the ideas by which people from the inside can see that fact.

This idea of a family friendly faith has turned American Christianity into a lifestyle without religion; action without belief; and like the Pharisees, an external semblance without internal reality. Dobson-style sheltering from bad influences is both wasteful of strength, spiritually counterproductive, and empirically idiotic if the goal of parenting is to keep the child in the faith. Christianity is a doctrine: it is not a culture, as if there were one canon expression of faith. It is not a lifestyle except as far as one’s life is lived by this doctrine. Let God be again glorified in creativity and innovation, and in the faith that his sovereign grace is strong enough to shine over even the worst of influences.

One of the main functions which the modern state has arrogated to itself in recent times, one which is almost universally viewed as legitimate now that it has become fully ingrained, is the setting of product standards. The FCC, FDA, USDA, CPSC, EPA, and other agencies constantly prevent countless products from ever even entering the market, and so-called “consumer advocates” nevertheless call for more. These obviously cause much loss to consumers with a higher risk preference – especially poor people for whom the extra costs of regulatory compliance may be burdensome. Yet though market theorists may like the idea that these can be totally replaced with private ratings agencies (such as Moody’s and S&P for bonds), such agencies are limited by information problems: people have assumptions about the meanings of words which a huckster may deliberately distort. In such cases, the information disseminated by ratings agencies may not get out or be heeded quickly enough for the market to force him out of business.

The regulatory arm of the state may be entirely replaced, however, with the idea of implicit contracts. In short, these are things which consumers will expect of a service by virtue of the definition of its label. For example:

• Consumers deposit money in a bank with the expectation that it will be available on-demand for withdrawal.
• Consumers eat food with the expectation that it will not make them immediately ill (Salmonella infected meat, for example – due exception for allergy, etc.)
• Consumers have a reasonable expectation of privacy from online applications (email, etc.), except if otherwise specified in the terms of service. For example, I expect Gmail will not reveal my emails to anyone except by subpoena.
• Consumers expect that the things they buy will not cause damage to their property in ways unrelated to their function (for example a toy painted with thermite, or a malicious piece of software).

The idea of implicit contracts may resemble in principle the sorts of things which the regulatory state takes upon itself. However, it differs in several key ways:

• They are settled exclusively by the courts. There may be no independent agency with any authority except perhaps to define such contracts, if allowed by constitutional amendment.
• They are only retroactively, not proactively, enforceable. A government agency has no right to inspect a factory until a complaint comes before the courts.
• They do not apply to durable goods for which (1) one may try before he buys, or (2) a warranty option exists. These automatically disclaim any liability except in case of demonstrable fraud or deliberate malice.
• Implicit contracts are discovered from prevailing cultural norms, not created, as regulations are. Thus, they may only demarcate qualitatively: there may be no quantitative thresholds such as the EPA is fond of.
• They are always overridden by explicit contracts (except in cases where the court might rule that there is an implicit metacontract in which explicit contracts are expected to be reasonably comprehensible).

And though private rating agencies may be insufficient, they are not unnecessary. Several of the aforementioned agencies engage in rating as well (for example, the USDA grades eggs and beef). If people value information like grades of eggs and beef or restaurant sanitation grades, then the market will not fail to provide should the USDA and other rating agencies be privatized.

Yet even so, though the modern regulatory state is far beyond useful scope, consumers should not bear the burden of near-universally held assumptions about the meanings of words with regard to their purchases. Indeed, these contracts ought to be construed narrowly enough that their violation constitutes a kind of fraud. This will go a long way to reduce information-gathering costs, and to engender the sort of consumptive confidence that good institutions are expected to provide for a well-functioning market, while at the same time barring from no consumer or honest producer the pursuit of happiness.

Let me know if you find typos, factual errors, logical errata, or just things to improve upon. These will then be incorporated into future editions.

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The new Writings section has also bumped ResEdit Pro off the downloads page. Classic was already long in the tooth when I abandoned it in 2006, and 4 years later, there was no reason to keep it except for historical interest. If you’re still dying to have it for whatever reason, let me know and I can send it.

The Problem

The government in the United States has increased dramatically in size and scope over the past century. The same may be observed in Europe with the rise of Social Democracy. Though the intellectual picture for free markets may look rosy with the discredit of orthodox Keynesianism with the oil shocks of the 70s, the Washington Consensus in the 80s, and the fall of Communism in the 90s, they are in no less danger now. The intellectual tides may have turned in our favor, but a far more formidable foe now looms ahead: institutional momentum.

A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the majority discovers it can vote itself largess out of the public treasury. After that, the majority always votes for the candidate promising the most benefits with the result the democracy collapses because of the loose fiscal policy ensuing, always to be followed by a dictatorship, then a monarchy.
-Unknown

The American public discovered this in 1933. The quote may be forgiven for its almost Machivavellian cyclical view of political history, but its indictment of Democracy has proven particularly prescient since the Great Depression and the New Deal. It’s not for no reason that social security is now called the “third rail of American Politics” for example – touch it and you die. With only small blips during the Reagan and Clinton years, the regulatory-welfare state has monotonically expanded since that time, for exactly these reasons. The author of the quote would hardly be surprised to see the explosion of the budget deficit since the 1940s, though its acceleration over the past decade (which will continue to accelerate, if the current political climate is any indication) would no doubt have surprised even the most sordid pessimist.

Those familiar with Public Choice theory will note that it predicts this exact same effect more rigorously: with dispersed costs and concentrated benefits to each piece of pork, protection, or regulation, nobody mobilizes to stop its expansion. And so we get a budget deficit which heeds not its impending fiscal collapse. Indeed, Iceland has already experienced this, and Britain is well on its way. With legislators exchanging vote for vote, the effect is always more spending, regulation, and protection.

The Solution

F. A. Hayek laid out in his works on spontaneous order the necessity of rules which are completely general and nondiscriminatory. Essentially, total equality before the law: when the government confers special favors on people (or is even given the authority to do so), incentives are perverted and everyone is worse off.

Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex and intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple and stupid behavior.
-David Allen in Getting Things Done

Abolish the legislature.

Now this sentiment may sound familiar, and make some uneasy. Indeed, this was tried all the time by emperors in Rome, usually to the detriment of the empire. Why was it so harmful? The power previously wielded by the legislature was taken over by the executive. This is no doubt harmful: I do not mean to increase the power of the executive at all. I mean to replace some measure of the power of the legislature with the judiciary, and the rest with… nothing.

There is a notion in the West that governments ought to be responsive to their people, hence the existence of a legislature. Certainly this is better than a dictatorship with an all-powerful executive branch which goes as it will without respect to the people. But this is only because the people constrain their government in certain ways – for example, once freedom is enjoyed, it can only be taken away very gradually or under duress (though in reality, this duress is often very easy to exploit – for example, the New Deal after the Great Depression, the Patriot Act after 9/11, the Investment and Recovery Act after the financial crisis). But the relevant question is not how responsive a government is to its people: the question is what is the government’s scope. A responsive activist government is preferable to a capricious and nonresponsive activist government, but a nonresponsive minimalist government is preferable to both. This is what Hayek had in mind with general rules: rules which do not change.

So what would this system look like? The law of the land would be a constitution with general rules and principles such as the guarantee of life, liberty, and property, the protection of these from both the government and other people, and a strict separation of economy and state. Other principles (such as the provision of public goods) can be added or not at the discretion of the founders. The courts then interpret these on a case by case basis and establish more specifics. How far is advertising allowed to stretch the truth before it becomes fraud? What rights are children afforded? These are questions to be decided by the judiciary based on these principles, which also would set punishment for infractions. With very simple and fixed trade, immigration, and other policies (unconditional free trade and movement), a large function of the legislature is obviated.

Of course, the legislature does exist for a legitimate general purpose: no constitution can foresee all circumstances. Though this problem is for the most part covered by making the constitution general (yet strict) and leaving the specifics to the judiciary, there may be cases in which something more drastic is required. In such a case, there is a process of constitutional amendment – which would also be the only way in which new bureaucracy could be formed. For example, the FDA, the EPA, the FCC, and any number of executive offices would have no authority to exist except by constitutional amendment. In this way, extreme necessity can allow for some degree of flexibility, but the dangers of an unconstrained legislature such as we have now are for the most part avoided.

Ultimately, people will know what they are getting legally. There will be less uncertainty, less rent-seeking, and more freedom without a legislature. Government will indeed be less responsive to the whims of the people, but given its dramatically reduced scope, fixed and general laws will serve the people much better than a legislature ever could.