This is the saving grace of piracy, that it adjusts our economy to changes made necessary by technology. Despite desperate attempts to stop the hemorrhaging with legal band-aids like the DMCA, ACTA, a number of copyright term extensions, and most recently SOPA and PIPA, the market continues to adjust around them. There already exists a professional class of distributors – “pirates” – which are taking over the markets of the old distributors with increased efficiency and variety. As the old habits of physical distribution become more and more anachronistic, jobs will move from the old distributors to other places where they are more needed. Unemployment will not rise with the demise of the intellectual property industry, even in the short term, because piracy will have already adjusted our economy to the new state of affairs.

This is indeed the saving grace of speculators, entrepreneurs, and anyone whose business it is to predict the future: they change the market to reflect changed or changing conditions. They give us soft landings instead of hard crashes. The price rises they appear to cause in fact cause us to save in anticipation of a shortage. Changes in supply and demand will happen with or without speculators and entrepreneurs; the only question is, will they take us by surprise, or will we be prepared?

Thus the proliferation of anti-piracy laws serve only to leave the world economy brittle and ill-prepared for the changes being brought about by advances in technology. If there is mass unemployment resulting from the demise of the intellectual property industry, it will be because they have used the strong arm of government to prevent the necessary adjustments in the economy from occurring beforehand.

But what exactly constitutes a foolish controversy? What seems logical and beautiful to one may seem to a simpler person to be idle speculation. Indeed, there is a strong anti-intellectual trend which treats any systematization of theology beyond what is necessary for daily life as a foolish controversy. But practical applicability to ethical situations cannot be the standard by which fruitfulness is decided, for is not an appreciation of the beauty of God an end in itself, without regard to behavior? God demands our affections, not just our behavior. To stifle the rigorous application of logic to scripture is to close an avenue by which God captures the imagination and therefore affection.

Instead, my goal here is to develop the Lutheran boundary between fruitful inquiry and worthless speculation, vaguely alluded to in Bondage of the Will, with Hayekian categories propounded in The Theory of Complex Phenomena – specifically with regard to questions probing into the will of God.

In the first place, we must be clear on what we are talking about. The moral will of God is perfectly clear in a way that the particular will of God is not:

We must discuss God, or the will of God, preached, revealed, offered to us, and worshipped by us, in one way, and God not preached, nor revealed, nor offered to us, nor worshipped by us, in another way. . . .

Now, God in his own nature and majesty is to be left alone; in this regard, we have nothing to do with him, nor does he wish us to deal with him. We have to deal with him as clothed and displayed in his word, by which he presents himself to us. That is his glory and beauty, in which the Psalmist proclaims him to be clothed (Ps. 21:5). . . . God preached works to the end that sin and death may be taken away, and that we may be saved. . . .

But God hidden in majesty neither deplores nor takes away death, but works life and death, and all in all; nor has he set bounds to himself by his word, but has kept himself free over all things.

. . . God does many things which he does not show us in his word, and he wills many things which he does not in his word show us that he wills. Thus, he does not will the death of a sinner – that is, in his word; but he wills it by his inscrutable will. At present, however, we must keep in view his word and leave alone his inscrutable will; for it is by his word, and not by his inscrutable will, that we must be guided. In any case, who can direct himself according to a will that is inscrutable and incomprehensible? (pp. 169-171)

The distinction seems to be that the will of God Preached, that is of the Word of God, is clear enough to be discussed, but that the secret will of God, by which all things pass, should be left quite alone. He continues shortly thereafter,

I say, as I said before, that we may not debate the secret will of Divine Majesty, and that the recklessness of man, who shows unabated perversity in leaving necessary matters for an attempted assault on that will, should be withheld and restrained from employing itself in searching out those secrets of Divine Majesty; for man cannot attain unto them, seeing that, as Paul tells us (cf. 1 Tim. 6:16), they dwell in inaccessible light. But let man occupy himself with God incarnate, that is, with Jesus crucified, in whom, as Paul says (cf. Col. 2:3), are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (though hidden); for by him man has abundant instruction both in what he should and in what he should not know.(pp. 175-176)

But Luther certainly says things about the secret will of God. In addition to the third paragraph of the first blockquote above, he says that “The Christian’s chief and only comfort in every adversity lies in knowing that God does not lie, but brings all things to pass immutably, and that his will cannot be resisted, altered, or impeded” (p. 84). Nor do the scriptures themselves shy away from making statements like “God causes all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose,” which seems like a general statement about the secret will of God.

The difference, of course, will be noted. To inquire into the moral will of God Preached is to apply general principles to specific situations, which if they do not uniquely determine an answer at least suggest a course of action. It may be profitably asked, “what would it look like to turn the other cheek in this situation?”, or “would buying a larger house demonstrate a lust of the flesh?”. What we can say about the secret will of God, however, though substantial, is not of such an immediately applicable nature. Given the fact that the secret will of God works all things for good to those who love him, it cannot be assumed that this principle will work in any particular way.

This distinction comports well with Hayek’s distinction between simple and complex phenomena: “The minimum number of elements of which an instance of the pattern must consist in order to exhibit all the characteristic attributes of the class of patterns in question appears to provide an unambiguous criterion.” That is, the more variables involved in the application of a theory to a particular instance, the more complex it is.

Hence, given the relatively small scope of the information which the human mind can correlate at one time, the principles in the Word of God are relatively simple. “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, and with all your mind” has no variables at all. If there is a question as to whether this command applies, the answer is yes. Even more difficult questions, such as the definition of murder (is killing in self defense murder?), at most add one more variable to a question which already involves only one. There may be debates on what precisely the variables involved are, but no answer will involve more than a few. The human cannot be morally responsible for what he cannot conceive.¹

On the other hand, a more complex phenomenon than the operation of the secret will of God cannot be imagined. The relevant variables are, quite literally, all of them. To determine specifically, not only whose good any particular circumstance works for but in what manner it works that good, would involve vastly more knowledge than any human mind is capable of correlating.

Hayek notes that “Such a theory [of a complex phenomenon] will . . . be one of small empirical content, because it enables us to predict or explain only certain general features of a situation which may be compatible with a great many particular circumstances. . . . In any case the range of phenomena compatible with it will be wide and the possibility of falsifying it correspondingly small.” Thus, the more complex a phenomenon, the smaller the range of particular phenomena will be ruled out by a theory as to its operation. The inclusion of everything under the sovereign will of God, being the most complex imaginable phenomenon, must thus be tautologically compatible with every observed particular circumstance. This denies Romans 8:28 the title of a scientific theory, which it never purported to be in the first place, but merely shows that the applicability of Hayek’s principles do not necessarily limit themselves to the strictly scientific.

The takeaway then, is that though we can know (and scripture reveals to us) patterns which emerge in the operation of the secret will of God, this pattern will rarely be recognizable as such. Its application to particular circumstances constitutes prying, as Luther put it. In the first place, the good being worked for is a spiritual good. The working of the Holy Spirit makes that good independent of circumstance. Though God indeed often works through circumstance as a proximate cause, it is not a necessary cause. To misunderstand that good as a material or circumstantial good is to invite such errors as a prosperity gospel. Furthermore, to attempt an application to particular events is an irrelevant exercise in falsification. The good of the elect will be accomplished regardless of our ability to comprehend it, and to try despite our inability is only to invite disappointment when our expectations do not pan out. “The validity of this general proposition is not dependent on the truth of the particular applications which were first made of it.”²

Luther argued that there are knowable principles by which the secret will of God operates, yet strongly condemned inquiry into its particulars. It would seem then that Luther, in drawing the boundary between profitable and useless theological inquiry, abided by and roughly anticipated (even if he did not articulate) the distinctions which Hayek found necessary to draw between the methods of the sciences dealing with phenomena of varying complexity. This keen awareness of the limits of what knowledge the mind can synthesize gave Hayek “an attitude of humility and reverence towards that experience of mankind as a whole that has been precipitated in the values and institutions of existing society,” a reverence which Luther would more rightly direct to God.

1. As Hayek notes in another work (The Constitution of Liberty (1960), p. 83), moral responsibility must “refer only to such effects of his conduct as it is humanly possible for him to foresee and to such as we can reasonably wish hum to take into account in ordinary circumstances. To be effective, responsibility must be both defined and limited, adapted both emotionally and intellectually to human capacities.”
2. Hayek continues, with regard to the theory of natural selection: “If, for example, it should have turned out that, in spite of their structural similarity, man and ape were not joint descendants from a comparatively near common ancestor but were the product of two convergent strands starting from ancestors which differed much more from each other (such as is true of the externally very similar types of marsupial and placental carnivores), this would not have refuted Darwin’s general theory of evolution but only the manner of its application to the particular case.”

19. Mogwai – Hardcore Will Never Die But You Will Post-rock
Slightly more boring than their last few albums.

18. Subway To Sally – Schwarz In Schwarz Medieval/Folk Metal
Nothing we haven’t heard before, though the throwback in Kämpfen Wir! was unexpectedly fun.

17. Falls of Rauros – The Light that Dwells in Rotten Wood Folk/Atmospheric Black Metal
Vast improvement over previous albums.

16. Alda – Tahoma Folk/Atmospheric Black Metal
Essentially the same album as #17, but I won’t complain.

15. September Malevolence – Our Withers Unwrung Post-rock

14. Sólstafir – Svartir Sandar Progressive Black/Heavy Metal

13. Omnia – Musick & Poetree Celtic Folk
Besides a few painful moments (I Don’t Speak Human, F*** Her Gently), a thankful reprieve from whatever the heck Wolf Love Was (last year’s biggest disappointment).

12. Ghost Brigade – Until Fear No Longer Defines Us Death/Doom Metal
Heard about this one from Fursy’s (of Les Discrets) excellent video for Clawmaster.

11. Skogen – Vittra Atmospheric Black Metal

10. ASP – Fremd Gothic Metal/Electronic
More electronic and less folk, but still immaculately produced and a catchy album.

9. Burlap to Cashmere – Burlap to Cashmere Mediterranean Folk/Rock
Much more mature than their 13-year-old debut.

8. Wolves in the Throne Room – Celestial Lineage Atmospheric Black Metal
The song titles make me think of Xasthur (not a good thing). Nonetheless the ambient pieces are interesting, and it’s strong overall.

7. Heretoir – Heretoir Post-Black Metal

6. Faun – Eden Celtic Folk

5. Woven Hand – Black of the Ink Apocalyptic Folk
It’s labelled alt-country, but if “apocalyptic folk” describes anything, it’s this.

4. Yggdrasil – Irrbloss Folk Black Metal

3. Mamiffer – Mare Decendrii Ambient

2. Deafheaven – Roads to Judah Post-Black Metal

1. Tenhi – Saivo Apocalyptic Folk
Really the only spectacular release this year.

Best Debut: Seidr – For Winter Fire Doom Metal

Best EP: Alcest – Le Secret Post-Black Metal
Ok, it’s a re-release, but the songs are re-recorded (and much better produced) so it counts as a 2011 release.

The idea of coercion is central to many strands of Libertarian thought, held up as the summum malum and opposed to voluntarism. But to actually define coercion precisely enough to build a political theory on it is a bit trickier. In general, definitions can be grouped into two broad categories:

1) Rights-based definitions
One starts with a series of rights, and coercion is defined as the violation of these. Such a definition, however, just moves the problem to the definition or delineation of rights. Natural rights don’t stop the buck; their assertion must be backed up with a further “why”. Nor is the distinction between positive and negative rights viable as anything but a rule of thumb.

The problem may be solved by the empirical (or evolutionary) natural rights approach, in which rights evolve through institutional selection toward the best bundle. In doing so it makes irrelevant many classic moral dilemmas. This evolutionary process is in fact thwarted by the kind of rationalistic philosophizing used in traditional rights theories: to derive and institute a set of rights from pure reason erases all institutional memory. The consistent application of a rationally derived ethical theory to edge cases¹ is profoundly dissatisfying, and awkward to explain away. The margin at which any ethical principle becomes inappropriate is a question only such a process can settle (which suggests that such ethical theories are not axiomatic and cannot be derived from pure reason).

If, therefore, rights are defined or found to include life, liberty, and property, then coercion is identified with aggression, and comports with the classic Libertarian treatment. If (according to the various theories of rights, respectively) reason were to show or institutions prevailed in which employment were a right, then to threaten termination would be coercion as well. And in Finland, the threat to terminate internet service would count too. In short, the concept of coercion is exactly as clear cut as the theory of rights behind it.

2) Rights-prior definitions
Alternatively coercion can be defined as a thing-in-itself, without reference to rights.

[W]e are tempted to define “coercion” by the use of such terms as “the interference with legitimate expectations,” or “infringement of rights,” or “arbitrary interference”. But in defining coercion we cannot take for granted the arrangements intended to prevent it. . . . Coercion not only would exist, but would be much more common if no such protected sphere existed [i.e. if there were no rights]. Only in a society that has already attempted to prevent coercion by some demarcation of a protected sphere can a concept like “arbitrary interference” have any meaning.²

Hayek identifies the first definition with “arbitrary interference”, but maintains the concept of coercion itself as something independent of rights and institutions. But an independent definition comes at the cost of clear delineation between “coercion” and “not coercion”. Notwithstanding the (not unproblematic³) examples earlier in the chapter which read as an attempt to draw such a line,⁴ Hayek admits that “coercion is, in the last resort, a matter of degree”⁵. Any definition independent of a clear-cut series of rights permits only that more or less severe coercion be spoken of.

Hayek’s own definition, being subjected to the arbitrary will of another, is problematic for Libertarian theory. For many things subject us to the arbitrary will of another which a natural rights theorist would not consider coercive. To return to the threat of termination, this sanction is great enough that the employee is generally pliable under the direction of his superior, even to be directed to do specific things, something Hayek indicates as a sine qua non of coercion.⁶ The employer need not be a monopsonist to exercise a great deal of control this way. And given his admission that a monopolist of necessities may be coercive (see footnote 3), it would be somewhat inconsistent to call the threat of termination noncoercive.

Indeed, from the perspective of the employee, for the purposes of his action the employer is not much different from a government. Yes, one can find another employer, but one can also leave the country. The fact that the latter is usually much more difficult only shows again that the difference is one of degree, not of kind.

Coercion’s opposite therefore, voluntarism, must likewise be a matter of degree. Hayek refers at the beginning to the case where “my handed is guided by physical force to trace my signature”,⁷ somehow distinguishing this from “coercion proper” by the fact that one has not acted, but treating it as essentially the same. It would perhaps be more apt to call this perfect coercion, in that all options but one have been removed from the array of choices. Further down the scale are situations he calls the more severe forms of coercion – the threat of physical force. “While we may pity the weak or the very sensitive person whom a mere frown may “compel” to do what he would not do otherwise, we are concerned with coercion that is likely to affect the normal, average person.”⁸ And below his threshold of relevance to policy lie voluntarily entered coercion: “A morose husband, a nagging wife, or a hysterical mother may make life intolerable unless their every mood is obeyed. But here society can do little to protect the individual beyond making such associations with others truly voluntary.”

But as we have seen, “voluntary” must be as much a matter of degree as coercion. If there is no “true coercion”, then there is nothing “truly voluntary”. We are all forced to a greater or lesser extent to adapt our actions to the outside world. In another work Hayek even speaks of the “impersonal coercion” of the market.⁹ His argument appears to be that a line is impossible to draw, but we have to draw one somewhere. Perhaps the impossibility indicates instead that the justification for liberty must rest on a more solid foundation than its juxtaposition against coercion. To thus define liberty as the absence of coercion is, as he (rightly) accuses John Stuart Mill of doing in On Liberty, and for the same reasons, to “overstate the case for liberty.”¹⁰

As a final note, Coase saw the firm as an island of central planning in a sea of voluntary market operations. In the same way, we might see the morose husband and nagging wife as islands of coercion in a more broadly voluntary system. Besides identifying the poles at a particular level, the distinction between planned and emergent must also be a matter of degree, for even a truly free market is made up of many plans. Even a series of planned economies could conceivably arrive at some sort of emergent order (market-like, though not a market) from competition with one another. Hayek’s vision of pervasive small-scale coercion existing within and supporting a broader voluntary framework is the more general version of Coase’s vision, generalized outside the firm and stripped of the language of intention. The firm centrally plans by coercing, in a sense, and coerces in order to plan.

It is misleading therefore to rail against coercion as such, as Mill did in On Liberty, and as Hayek does in The Constitution of Liberty. Mill saw that social opprobrium, for the purposes of human action, is not essentially different from coercion by force. Hayek saw that the obliteration of this distinction inevitably led to the centralization and expansion of coercion to prevent the smaller forms. But neither was willing to conclude that coercion as such is not the problem. Coercion in a sense exists everywhere we are required to adjust our actions to the existence of others. Economics should teach us, therefore, to look for an optimum at the margin, and to seek institutions which may approximate that optimum through spontaneous processes. A categorical opposition to coercion is ultimately a poor foundation for a political philosophy.

1. The classic example for the non-aggression principle is the misanthrope whose genome fortuitously contains the cure for cancer. Unfortunately he will not part with a single hair for any price, and it would violate the non-aggression principle to retrieve it against his will.
2. Hayek, F.A. The Constitution of Liberty (1960), p. 139.
3. For example, in the discussion of resource control (Ibid., pp. 135f), any line between the “coercive” water monopolist and the “noncoercive” portrait monopolist must be arbitrary. Necessity is relative.
4. For example immediately prior to the initial discussion of the coercive monopolist he says “Coercion should be carefully distinguished from the conditions or terms on which our fellow men are willing to render us specific services or benefits,” as if there were indeed a clear categorical line (Ibid., p. 135). Later he speaks of “true coercion” (p. 137) implying the same thing.
5. Ibid., p. 146.
6. “So long as the act that has placed me in my predicament is not aimed at making me do or not do specific things, so long as the intent of the act that harms me is not to make me serve another person’s ends, its effect on my freedom is not different from that of any natural calamity.” (Ibid., p. 137) The employer-employee relationship would appear to satisfy both these conditions of coercion.
7. Ibid., p. 133.
8. Ibid., p. 138.
9. Competition as a Discovery Procedure (1968).
10. The Constitution of Liberty, p. 146.

If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all.

Romans 12:18

To be clear, this verse is not saying that peace should be the ends of government. It is useless to try to build a social doctrine for unbelievers from scripture, for it has nothing to offer them without salvation. However, this verse should powerfully bind the conscience of any Christian with a political or economic ideology.

As an example, I believe it is well established that maximizing personal liberty is, in most cases, the most durable institutional safeguard for peace, both civil and international. The Democratic Peace Theory is better understood as a Capitalist Peace. Exchange turns hostile zero-sum relationships into mutually beneficial ones, and as these relationships pervade society they form an extended order – a social fabric of exchange. The more that order is diminished and restrained, the more competition becomes zero-sum, leading to the outbreak of violence. My conscience is therefore bound to support the expansion of the market and to oppose the diminution of that order so far as it depends on me – that is, in my vote and in my activism. If I were a lawmaker, “so far as it depends on me” would entail much more responsibility.

If, however, I believed that Capitalism is inherently imperialistic, then given my understanding, this verse would prohibit me from being a Capitalist. Or if it were believed that income inequality generates social unrest, then that could be an impetus of conscience for supporting the welfare state.

This verse does preclude some ideologies completely, for example Fascism, which also runs afoul of the prohibition of idolatry in its demand for total allegiance. Revolutionary Socialism would also be very difficult to square with the Biblical ideal of peace. However, for most ideologies enjoying a modicum of respect, it is important to note that the debate has moved from the theological to the ideological. To tell a Democratic Socialist that he is a bad Christian is to misappropriate the scriptures in service of an ideology. If he agrees that peace is his ideal, then he must be convinced on the merit of the ideas, not from scriptural proofs.

However, far from serving an ideology, the command to live peaceably with all gives our political ideologies an importance that makes partisanship and side-staking not only intellectually dishonest, but spiritually perilous. As voters and as activists, we wield a small portion of an enormous power over other peoples’ lives. If ever intellectual honesty mattered, it is here, in determining what policies best produce peace.

To those who support the welfare state as a matter of social peace, then, its rotten fruit is beginning to show in Greece, and here in America. An entitlement mentality created by the welfare state reacts explosively with the disillusionment resulting from its inevitable depletion. And no recourse can be had to compassion. The care of scripture is for the soul, precisely what the collectivization of charity removes from the picture. The Christian welfarist must be able to show not only that his favored system is better than Greece’s, but that the incentives are such that it will not devolve into bankruptcy.

It is not necessarily a failure of conscience to support welfare policies, or even Democratic Socialism. These ideologies share with Capitalism a belief in the primary social value of peace. The crucial point of conscience is, however, that these ideologies can never achieve what they aim for, most of all because they are not sustainable. Political incentives always lead to benefits becoming more and more widely distributed – the spoils of taxation. And what could be more inimical to peace than to create a class of dependents who will be left out in the cold when the money runs out?

Welfarism is not necessarily itself morally wrong, but it is a false promise. Scripture invites us to judge it on its own merit, and it fails. It is not unconscionable, but inhumane.