Inflation & Exchange: In Defense of Backed Currency

Inflation & Exchange: In Defense of Backed Currency

Listening to the economic establishment, one would think that fixed exchange rates were a vestige of times past, and the gold standard a thoroughly discredited idea. After all, didn’t the Great Depression hit countries on the gold standard harder? Didn’t the collapse of the Bretton Woods system sound the death knell for regulation of the value of a currency? Wasn’t it a pegged currency which led to the Asian Financial Crisis?

It’s easy to look at the character of a currency pegged to a particular value (whether dollars or gold) as regulation, and a floating currency as letting the market have its say about the relative values of currencies. But this abdicates from money its role as the unit of exchange – the anchor by which all prices are reckoned.

One might well ask, why does money need to be an anchor? Have we not done fine since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates? This misses the point: there must always be a price anchor. We function well enough without an anchor because currencies are depreciating slowly enough that we can act as if they were anchored in the short run. Yet in the long run, all currencies must tend towards the value of their base – in the case of a floating currency zero. Indeed, the history of all floating currencies is a tendency, sometimes quick and sometimes slow, towards worthlessness.

If our current system of floating fiat currencies then is insufficient and unstable, then what alternative is there? Has not the failure of fixed currencies been made manifest?

The characteristic feature of pegged currencies is that they impose a limit upon central banks: the monetary base may not inflate unduly, either through cheap credit or printing money. If this happens, the market value of the currency drops – and to prop it up, the central bank must buy the currency with reserves at the fixed price. Eventually the reserves run out, and either the government goes bankrupt (as was the case in Thailand, which had fueled the widening disparity between the Baht and the Dollar to which it was pegged by cheap credit), or it is forced to devalue (as Mexico had to do with the Peso in the early 1990s when investors determined the government’s 3.5 pesos/dollar policy was out of line with its market value).

Every case where a pegged currency collapsed was due to governments failing to heed this constraint. Indeed, one of the causes of the Great Depression was the attempt to return to prewar gold parity after massive inflation to pay for World War I. It is not the case that “economies got too big for gold”; it is the case that a pegged currency made the consequences of fiscal and monetary irresponsibility more immediately manifest. And of course what better justification for irresponsibility than the necessity of paying for a world war?

This is perhaps the most evident form of price distortion caused by inflation and deflation. Right now, central banks manipulate their currencies’ value by buying and selling reserves in order to improve the competitiveness of their exports. China in particular, by pegging their currency to the dollar as it weakens, stands to gain enormously on the world market. This should be the first sign that something isn’t working right: when an industry can become more competitive relative to its foreign competitors simply by adjustments by the central bank. There is no productivity increase – the exporting industries in this inflationary country have done nothing at all to merit their more favorable position.

What then is the buying of foreign reserves with new money, except an indirect and general subsidy on exports? The central bank spends money, in the process giving unmerited help to domestic industries. And since everybody’s doing it, everyone is forced to do the same. Like Mali, ruthlessly impoverished by America’s cotton subsidies which made Mali’s cottons uncompetitive with less productive American cotton, the country which does not send its currency along with everyone else’s down on the spiral towards worthlessness will be plundered by these implicit subsidies.

This is not a merely hypothetical fear: Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman is worried that China is plundering us in exactly this manner. Thailand, South Korea, Russia and the Philippines are scrambling to devalue their currencies relative to the dollar to protect their exports from Chinese competition.

What then is to be done? Perhaps government fiat has permanently spoiled the character of money as an anchor, at least until the slide towards worthlessness begins to accelerate worldwide. I see no impetus for governments to reconsider the wisdom passed down from Keynes until world prices begin to skyrocket uncontrollably. Perhaps a Bretton Woods II would be appropriate: a multilateral agreement to peg currencies to the current market price of gold, and more importantly, not to inflate after that point.

Or, the power of the determination of the unit of account could be removed from governments entirely. As it is now, the effects of inflation on investors are offset so long as governments are willing to pay interest plus expected inflation on government bonds, which they always are, for the lavish and irresponsible spending of Western governments is funded by these bonds (in the absence of the trust required to issue bonds, governments may choose to fund by print-inflation, as Zimbabwe – which compresses the long-term doom of fiat currency into a much shorter time period). Without control of the currency, interest rates can no longer mask the pernicious effects of inflation. No longer will one be guaranteed a return by investing in nonproductive activity.

The benefits of private currencies are numerous. For one, they may not rely on fiat, and so they must necessarily be anchored to a particular base (UPDATE – not necessarily; however the main point still stands). Without a bond market, this allows the market to equalize relative prices among the various currencies, an incontrovertibly good and natural process of the market which is nevertheless subverted by inflationary distortions made manifest in exchange rate fluctuations. This adjustment in turn prevents both the indirect subsidies of devaluation and the subsequent plunder of one economy by another.

Government control of money is a major conflict of interest. The incentives are to inflate, devalue, and fiddle in order to improve one’s lot relative to other currencies. Central banks, knowing well that rational expectations will thwart the effect of many of their attempted policies, must to some degree or another rely on either the element of surprise (most Western banks), or outright secrecy (the Chinese bank). Private competition without the use of fiat will necessarily increase transparency, for the incentive is stability, thus eliminating the need for secrecy and surprise. Well-managed currencies with strong reserves backing them will prosper, while any damage done by poorly managed currencies will be quickly cauterized, for holders will not allow a currency much leeway before moving to another. In this way, we get a system of well-managed currencies with a stable value, and disconnected from national interests.

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Hey, I'm C. Harwick, a web designer, musician and blogger living in Raleigh, where I work at a think tank.

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