Institutions Versus Individuals
Among political theorists, there is a debate among those who view the ends of government as protecting natural rights, and those who view its ends as promoting the maximum felicity of its citizens. The dichotomy may seem to be one of moral versus practical concerns, but political philosophers describe the whole question as moral – that is, regarding the ends of the institutions.

On the surface, this is not an entirely inappropriate use of the term. Morality indeed concerns ends – the ends of man. It is related to praxeology in that while praxeology is merely descriptive (i.e., “If mans ends are X, he will act by doing Y”), morality is normative (i.e., “Mans ends should be X”). In the same way, moral theories of government normatively prescribe the ends of government: government should act towards the ends of the rights of man, or towards the happiness of man.

However, the appropriateness ends there. Morality as such can only ever apply to the ends of individuals. The ends of institutions are fundamentally different in nature. The questions of individual aims – morality – involve conscience and self-interest (properly understood). The questions of institutional aims, on the other hand, must be answered institutionally. As Mises writes, the individual is the only proper locus of action (The Principle of Methodological Individualism): people must design institutions conducive to directing the actions of other people; the institution itself does not act.

It is thus not honest to call problems of the aims of government moral issues. I would like to posit the term morology, since there is no such distinctive term in use today as far as I’m aware.

Imperfect Information
An action may be said to be irrational insofar as it is inconducive to attaining the immediate goals of the actor (Whether or not such action exists is up for debate, depending on how broadly one defines immediate goals). Likewise, an action may be said to be immoral insofar as it is inconducive to attaining the Good. We act immorally because we do not know (or believe) what the Good is – thus, with perfect information, it is irrational to act immorally, now that one’s true and objective interests are known. In this way, praxeology becomes identical to morality.

Institutionally, though morology often takes on a normative tenor, it can never presume perfect information (no, not even Ayn Rand). Notwithstanding the few fringe theories that may presume objective a priori knowledge of the ends of institutional existence, most rights-based theories exist for reasons aesthetic or of consistency. Utilitarianism’s only normative claim is that the maximum utility of its constituency is the best goal we can know to strive for, which in most variants precludes any further normative claims.

Thus, praxeology may be compared to morality in that they both deal with individuals, and morology may be compared to praxeology in that they both deal with subjective values by way of imperfect information, but morality may in no way be compared to morology. It differs on both dimensions, making it doubly improper to call the ends of government a moral question.